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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the 
transaction of steel for ships in the prewar Japan.
Because many Japanese assembly industries 
such as automobile industry and electronical 
machinery industry had strong competitiveness 
since the 1970s, the inter-firm relationship between 
Japanese assembly firms and intermediate goods 
firms in postwar, has attracted much attention. 
Hence, there are only few empirical studies on 
transaction of Japanese intermediate goods of the 
pre-WWII period.
Furthermore, in terms of firm size, most parts 
and materials firms are small whereas representative 
assembly firms are large. Therefore, studies on 
Japanese “supplier system” concentrated on inter‒
firm relationships between large and small 
companies. 
Many scholars insist that inter-firm 
relationships of postwar Japan are characterized by 
the long-term obligational contract. The contract 
illustrates that the organizational principle strongly 
works. Nevertheless, all the transactions in Japan 
are not characterized by the long-term obligational 
contracts. In other words, it is highly probable that 
the market principle and the organizational principle 
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intermingled in inter-firm relationships. Based on 
this way of thinking, in this paper, I analyze 
transaction of steel in prewar Japan, especially in 
the 1930s, focusing on the intermingling of the 
market principle and the organizational principle. 
Steel was indispensible for a lot of industries 
as fundamental materials. In that sense, we can say 
that steel industry is a representative materials 
industry in Japan. In particular, Japanese steel 
industry became the key industry to supply the 
fundamental materials for Japan’s major industries 
in the 1930s.1 This is the reason why I focus on the 
1930s.
Indeed, although there are plenty of splendid 
studies on Japanese steel industry of prewar2, they 
don’t focus on transaction of steel. 
At the same time, through the 1930s, the 
shipbuilding industry’s demand for steel had been 
growing most rapidly in Japan. As such, this paper 
analyzes transaction of steel for ships.
1. Market Condition of Steel in the Prewar Japan
Market conditions, namely the balance of 
supply and demand, have a great influence on the 
transaction. Therefore, before the historical analysis 
of the inter-firm relationship in the steel industry, 
let me start with a discussion about market 
conditions in the prewar period.
(1) In World War I
In Japan, it is not until the World War I that 
the demand for steel increased in earnest. The war 
increased trade and created the “marine 
transportation boom”. Owing to the ship shortage, 
shipbuilding industry was booming. The demand of 
other machines also increased. Accordingly, the 
demand of steel for the industries exploded. For 
example, the demand for steel in Japan increased 
from 650,000 tons in 1914 to 1,122,000 tons in 
1918, an increase of approximately 1.7 times.3 
In response to this explosion in demand, 
Japanese steel companies actively constructed and 
expanded their rolling equipment for steel.4 As a 
result, the production of steel increased from 
283,000 tons in 1914 to 537,000 tons in 1918.5
Nonetheless, supplies of steel in Japan 
couldn’t keep up with the demand.6 Above all, after 
Germany and Belgium prohibited export to Japan, 
so did Great Britain and the US in April 1916 and in 
August 1917 respectively.7
In addition, the production capacity of 
Japanese steel companies was inadequate. For 
instance, although orders for steel that shipbuilding 
companies received and accepted amounted to 
110,000 tons during this war, Yawata Steel Works, 
which was the biggest producers of steel in Japan, 
was only able to accept order of 27,000 tons in 
total.8
According to Seitetsu Sankō Siryo,9 from 1914 
to 1918, self-sufficiency ratio of steel for ships was 
very low in spite of the difficulties regarding imports. 
For example, imports of steel for ships during the 
WWI comprised more than three-fourth of demand 
for the steel. Meanwhile, as machine manufacturing 
companies and metal processing companies 
demanded strongly a further more amount of steel 
to the Yawata, the steel market continued to be a 
seller’s market. 
So-called “iron and steel famine” problem 
then occurred and steel price soared. Even the 
agreement for the “exchange between Japanese 
ships and U.S. steel” in 1918 was not able to solve 
the severe steel shortage. In particular, because the 
“exchange” concentrated on steel for shipbuilding 
companies, other customers of steel apart from 
sufferred more from the shortage of steel. 
(2) After World War I and the 1920s
Nevertheless, the market condition for steel 
in Japan changed dramatically after the war. Above 
all, the steel demand decreased sharply. Specifically, 
the end of “shipbuilding boom” and the sharp 
decrease of demand for steel for ships was followed 
by marine transportation recession after WWI. The 
conclusion of the Washington Treaty in 1922 
critically influenced the naval disarmament, which, 
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in turn, decreased substantially the demand for 
steel for military use and for warships.10
With regard to supply of steel,steel factories 
that had begun to be built towards the end of WWI 
had not been yet completed during the war and were 
then finished one after another after the war ended. 
Hence, production capacity expanded rapidly soon 
after the war. Besides, even though two Japanese 
shipbuilding companies, Kawasaki Shipbuilding Co. 
and Asano Shipbuilding Co. started in-house 
production of steel during the war, it was not until 
1919 that they were able to produce substantial 
amount of steel.11 
Furthermore, as European countries and the 
US produced an excess of steel supply after the war, 
those countries increased steel exports to Japan in 
order to mitigate the oversupply problem.12 
(3) In the 1930s
In the era of the Great Depression from the 
end of 1929, the oversupply of steel increased 
drastically because of sharp decline in demand of 
steel in Japan. The buyer’s market continued.
However, along with the recovery from the 
Depression, the demand for steel began to increase. 
Furthermore, the increase in demand accelerated in 
the late 1930s. Eventually, the short supply of steel 
became more serious, resulting in another “iron and 
steel famine” as in the period of WWI. The steel 
market then became a seller’s market again and 
steel producers had the upper hand over the steel 
customers. In that sense, steel market in the 1930s 
shared common points with that of that of WWI. 
That is, as in the WWI period, excessive supply and 
sellers’ market continued through the 1930s.
On the other hand, compared with WWI, 
there were significant differences in the period. 
First, as seen in Table 1, in the 1930s, Japan had 
become self-sufficient in steel. In other words, 
whereas most of steel demand was met by imports 
Table 1 Domestic steel production, imports, and exports (1932-40, thousand tons, %)
Year Domestic production Imports Exports Self-sufficiency ratio
1932 2,123 235 300 103
1933 2,792 410 435 101
1934 3,323 427 596 105
1935 3,978 357 823 113
1936 4,548 345 990 117
1937 5,080 815 773  99
1938 5,489 339 799 109
1939 5,381 197 931 107
1940 5,261 312 793 110
Source: Iida, Ohashi, and Kuroiwa,eds.(1969),320;Yonekura(1994),159.
Table 2  Production, import and self-sufficiency ratio of steel for ships(1912-19, thousand tons, %)
Year Production Import Total supply Self-sufficiency ratio
1912  5   21   26 22
1913  6   21   27 25
1914 10   34   44 23
1915 10   33   43 23
1916 15   60   75 20
1917 20 129 149 13
1918 20 234 254 12
1919 30 241 271 11
Source: Nagura,1984.302; Seitetsugyô Sankô Siryô [Reference Materials of Steel and Iron Industry].
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during WWI(Table 2), all the steel demand could be 
met by domestic production in the 1930s. Moreover, 
the export ratio of domestic steel production was 
low throughout the 1930s. In the seller’s market, 
Japanese steel producers derived much more benefit 
due to expansion in demand. 
The high self-sufficiency ratio and the low 
export ratio of domestic steel production meant 
that the transaction between Japanese steel 
companies and customers had become more 
important in the 1930s than in WWI. As such, in 2, 
we focus on steel transaction in the 1930s.
2. The Steel Transaction in the 1930s 
(1) The Market Principle and the Organizational 
Principle in the Sales Methods and Distribution 
Routes
As described above, the Japanese steel 
market changed drastically to the sellers’ one since 
the mid-1930s. In the market condition, Nippon 
Steel Corporation13(hereinafter will be referred to as 
Nippon Steel) employed three sales methods of 
steel; the regular futures contract, the futures 
contract, and the spot trades. Whereas the former 
two methods suggest primary kinds of organizational 
transaction, the spot trade was included in market 
transaction. In brief, the big steel company in this 
period practiced market transaction as well as 
organizational transaction.
However, with regard to the distribution 
channel of big steel companies, the organizational 
principle was dominant. For example, Nippon Steel 
sold most steel through three distribution channels 
in 1936 and 1937; direct sales to customers, the 
sales through designated big wholesalers and the 
sales to merchants via the designated wholesalers.14 
All of the channels had characteristics of 
organizational transaction. 
(2) Cartel Activity and Its Limits
From 1930 to1932, cartels by producers were 
formed one after another in a lot of steel market 
segments except for a few monopoly steel segments. 
For example, cooperative sales associations were 
organized for black plates, wire rods, plates, medium 
plates, small angles, and medium angles and so on 
from 1930 to1931.
Moreover, in December 1932, the steel 
industry became subject to the Strategic Industries 
Control Act, which was enacted to strengthen the 
control of primary industries by the government. As 
the law was applied to the steel industry, cartels in 
this industry were supported by the government.15
These cartels did play important roles in 
reducing steel imports and in establishing a 
segmented division of labor between Yawata and the 
private steel companies. One of the reasons why the 
cartels were rather successful lay in the competitive 
structure of the industry,16 which represents the 
functioning of the market principle. In sum, in the 
case of steel cartels in this period, we can observe 
the organization principle and the market principle 
were complementary each other.
Nonetheless, in the some cases, there was 
conflict between the aim of cartels and interests of 
individual firms. Specifically, even though the cartels 
aimed to stabilize prices, there was always the 
strong temptation to violate the cartel price among 
the cartel members. From time to time, the cartels 
failed to stabilize prices and, outsiders even 
appeared, especially in a thin steel sheet cartel.17 In 
fact, it was reported that “disintegration” in some 
cartels began to happen in 1934.18 Hence, we can 
remark that there was a substitutive relationship as 
well as complementary one, as illustrated above, 
between the organization principle and the market 
principle.
(3)Inter-firm Relationship between Steel Producers 
and Wholesalers
In the Great depression, steel demand 
decreased rapidly. The steel market changed into a 
buyer’s market, which meant that Yawata’s power 
to control big merchants became weak. Furthermore, 
the “designated merchant system” of Yawata didn't 
function well. The same situation continued until 
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the establishment of Nippon Steel in 1934. 
However, on establishing Nippon Steel, it 
engaged in controlling steel merchants more 
strongly. In May 1934, the Sales Manager of Nippon 
Steel declared to control the commission of 
designated wholesalers and speculative competition 
among them.19 Indeed, Nippon Steel strengthened 
the “designated merchant system” after August 
1935. Under the system, the company selected and 
adopted not only designated wholesalers but 
designated merchants that were smaller and further 
downstream than big designated wholesalers.20 It 
means that the scope of the control by the large 
steel company expanded significantly. The 
organizational relationship between steel producers 
and merchants was enhanced from the mid-1930s. It 
demonstrates that the organizational principle 
strongly worked in the relationship. 
At the same time, along with seller’s market, 
the market principle worked in the relationship and 
the behavior of merchants. For instance, many 
behaviors of steel merchants were speculative in the 
autumn of 1936 because of supply short of steel, so 
that even the authoritarian intervention of the Sales 
Department of Nippon Steel did not work.21 
Furthermore, the individual designated merchants 
competed quite fiercely against each other. For 
example, each designated merchants competed 
intensively to buy further amount of steel from 
Nippon Steel while giving credits to small merchants. 
Both the organizational principle and the market 
principle worked simultaneouly in inter-firm 
relationship between the big steel company and the 
merchants.
3.  The Case of Steel Transaction for Ships in the 
1930s 
Although the consumption of steel for ships in 
the early 1910s was only three or four per cent of 
total demand for steel22, it increased dramatically 
during WWI, owing to the “shipbuilding boom”, as 
described earlier. In particular, in 1918, near the 
end of WWI, the consumption of steel for ships 
comprised approximately 30% of all the domestic 
steel demand.23 Moreover, according to government 
report, shipbuilding works consumed over 50 % steel 
of steel from machine factories that employed more 
than 30 employees in 1918.24
While the steel demand for the use of ships 
decreased substantially during the 1920s as a result 
of the Washington Treaty and following a Depression, 
the demand for steel for the use of machines, such 
as ships and electric equipments was increasing 
quite rapidly after the recovery from the Great 
Depression.25 
Specifically, business in the shipbuilding 
industry was booming. The value of production in 
shipbuilding industry increased from 38 million Yen 
in 1931 to 111 million Yen in 1936.26 Not only 
warship construction but also building of private 
merchant ships increased sharply. Accordingly, 
freighters occupied about two-thirds of private 
merchant ships in the same period.27As a result, 
through the 1930s, the steel demand of shipbuilding 
industry increased rapidly in Japan. 
Moreover, Japan achieved the complete self-
sufficiency of thick steel sheet that was mainly used 
for building ships in the 1930s. It suggests that 
transaction between Japanese companies became 
important in the market segment of the 1930s.
The market for steel for ships in this period 
had the characteristics of the organizational 
principle. First of all, to promote the marine and 
shipbuilding industries, the Japanese government 
actively intervened in the transaction of steel for 
ships. In addition, as with other kinds of steel 
products, a cartel was established in this market 
segment. Because both the market of shipbuilding 
and the market of steel for ships were oligopolistic, 
it was highly likely that organizational transaction 
such as obligational contractual relationships were 
practiced extensively in this steel market segment. 
At the same time, in the seller’s market that 
was a result of explosive increase of demand, the 
interests of the steel suppliers and the steel 
demanders frequently conflicted and they were even 
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at each other's throats as well as cooperative. In 
addition, they competed fiercely to expand their 
market shares. Accordingly, the steel market 
segment also had the characteristics of the market 
principle. In brief, it is highly probable that the steel 
market segment had the characteristics that indicate 
the market principle and the market principle and 
the organizational principle intermingled. These are 
the reasons why I will examine the transactions of 
steel for ships in the 1930s.
(1) Inter-firm Relationship between Cartels
The Organizational Principle in Transactions 
between Cartels
In the early 1930s, both Japanese shipbuilding 
companies and thick steel sheet producers, that is, 
suppliers and customers of steel for ships, formed 
cartels respectively. The shipbuilding companies 
organized the “Japanese Shipbuilders’ Association”
(Zosen Rengokai ) as a cartel in January 1932. The 
association mainly aimed joint purchasing of 
materials for ships and building the standard form of 
shipbuilding contract. In addition, the association 
assigned steel among ten member companies.28
The producers of thick steel sheet, more than 
6mm, also formed a cartel which consisted of Yawata 
Steel Works, Kawasaki Shipbuilding Corporation, 
Asano Shipbuilding Corportation, and Tokai Kogyo 
in February 1931. The main members of the cartel 
were first three companies except because Tokai 
Kogyo was virtually a subcontractor of Yawata Steel 
Works.
Both cartels carried out substantial transaction 
for steel for ships in the 1930s. A representative 
example is the steel transaction for the “subsidy for 
ship improvement”. The “subsidy”, which was 
carried out three times from October 1932 to 1937, 
was the government policy to promote breaking up 
old ships and, on the other hand, to promote the 
building of excellent ships.29 In this policy, both 
cartels repeatedly negotiated with each other for 
steel transaction, which was accompanied by the 
intervention of the government. For example, in 
November 1932, the Japanese Shipbuilders’ 
Association held the meeting of the board of 
directors in order to take measures against soaring 
steel price. Based on the conclusion of the meeting, 
the cartel of shipbuilders continued to negotiate 
with the thick steel sheet cartel. As a result, 
agreements on the price and the quantity were made 
several times between both the cartels.30 This 
implies that a kind of organization principle worked 
in this transaction.
With regard to steel prices, they had risen 
sharply in the seller’s market in the 1930s. 
However, the price of steel sheets “subsidy” for 
ships was very stable. Specifically, the agreement 
price of the steel for the “subsidy” ships between 
cartels was kept in relatively low compared with the 
market price (see the Table 3).31 This means that 
the price was stabilized by the agreement between 
the cartels. Furthermore, not limited to the 
Table 3 The price of thick steel sheet (Yen per ton)
Period
The price of thick steel 
sheet for ship 
improvement
The price of thick steel 
sheet
Price quotation of cartel of 
thick steel sheet
The Second Half of 1933 130 131 122
The First Half of 1934 120 136 124
The Second Half of 1934 116 153 125
The First Half  of 1935 121 112 108
1936 120 116 106
Source : Senpaku Kaizen Kyōkai Jigyoshi [The History of Activity of Ship Improvement Corporated Association]
(1943),218-233;Hashimoto(2004),213; Nittetsu Shasi Henshū Siryō [The Eding Documents of Nihon Steel 
Corpratation](1955), No.196, Tokyo.
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transaction of steel for “subsidy” ships, in the later 
1930s when steel prices rose sharply, the prices 
agreed by the cartels considerably stabilized.32 This 
illustrates that the organizational principle worked 
in the formation of steel prices.
The Market Principle in Transaction between 
Cartels
As the same time, the organizational principle 
didn’t work fully. For example, the shortage of 
supply became more serious in the late 1930s so 
that steel supply was insufficient even to satisfy the 
demand for steel for “ship improvement”. This fact 
suggests that even cooperation between the cartels 
could not solve the problem of short supply of steel. 
The conflicts between the cartels over steel 
prices occasionally took place as well.  For example, 
when the shipbuilders’ association negotiated with 
the thick steel sheet cartel for contract of steel for 
new ships in March 1936, the former requested the 
deferment of price quotes of the steel to the latter. 
Still, the negotiation ran into difficulties.33 Even 
though the agreement price of steel between the 
cartels should be decided by the end of 1936, it was 
not yet determined even in February 1937. The 
thick steel sheet cartel in March 1937 also requested 
the new price quote that was 50 Yen per ton higher 
than the old price quote. The shipbuilders thought 
that their business would be unprofitable at the new 
price quoted and that their operation could get into 
trouble. Therefore, the representative of the 
shipbuilders’ association visited Nippon Steel and 
petitioned to lower the price quote.34 This conflict 
of interests between both the cartels demonstrates 
that the market principle as well as the organizational 
principle was working strongly.
In addition, a severe conflict of interest among 
member companies of the shipbuilding cartel, Zosen 
Rengokai, frequently occurred. For instance, early 
in 1933, before the negotiation with the steel cartel, 
regarding steel purchasing, there was an internal 
complication in the shipbuilding cartel owing to the 
variance in price that member companies hoped to 
buy at. As a result, some shipbuilding companies 
individually engaged in buying steel because it 
became almost impossible for them to agree on the 
specific price amongst themselves.35 In 1937, during 
the steel shortage, members of Zosen Rengokai 
fiercely scrambled to purchase steel for ships, so 
that the government recommended the joint 
purchase of steel.36
Those conflicts of interest between cartels 
and within the cartels also illustrate that the market 
principle as well as the organizational principle 
worked in transaction of steel for ships.
(2) The Steel Transaction between Individual 
Companies
Reasons 
It is highly probable that suppliers and 
demanders of steel for ships in the period had 
reasons why they transacted individually as well as 
through negotiating between the cartels that they 
belonged to.
With respect to the market condition, as the 
market for steel for ships in the 1930s was a seller’s 
market, steel producers should have been able to 
sell in favorable terms in this time. Nonetheless, as 
described above, the agreement price between the 
cartels was controlled by the negotiation between 
the cartels and the government to prevent it from 
rising sharply. However, although the same 
agreement price was advantageous to customers, 
steel producers never had the strong motive to 
keep the price low.37
In addition, the purpose of the thick steel 
sheet cartel was to stop sharp fall of steel price in 
establishing the cartel. Nevertheless, as the 
economy recovered and a boom came to the steel 
market, the chief purpose of the cartel changed to 
the control of the rapid rise of the steel price. 
Therefore, as for steel companies, the motivation 
for continuing to be a member of the thick steel 
sheet cartel was decreasing. As a result, some 
shipbuilding companies individually engaged in 
buying steel.
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Furthermore, the steel for warships occupied 
considerably high proportion in the thick steel sheet 
market. For example, on average from 1933 to 
1935, a military demand comprised about 40 per 
cent of shipment of Yawata and Nippon Steel.38 In 
the late 1930s, the company’s business relating to 
military demand was unprofitable. In particular, 
despite of the “steel famine”, the severe short 
supply of steel, Nippon Steel’s profit per ton of 
thick steel sheet decreased after the latter half of 
1937.39 This highlights that big steel producers such 
as Nippon Steel had strong motives to sell the steel 
for merchant ships, including a motive to transact 
with individual shipbuilding companies as the 
transaction was not controlled by negotiation 
between cartels.
Moreover, shipbuilding companies as 
customers of steel have also strong motives to 
transact with the individual steel producers. Above 
all, the demand for steel for ships increased so 
rapidly that the quantity of thick steel sheet to be 
transacted between cartels was not sufficient to 
meet the growing demand.
As for the shipbuilding companies, warships 
construction business was not profitable in this 
period because of skyrocketing steel prices.40 For 
example, because Mitsubishi Shipbuilding Co. 
accepted the order for warships based on the low 
steel price in 1931 and 1932, it eventually suffered 
losses due to the rapid increase of steel price.41 As 
a result, most shipbuilders tried to actively expand 
the business of merchant shipbuilding in order to 
increase the purchasing of steel for the ships. 
According to the data in Hanbai Jumpō in the 
mid-1930s, the number of application for steel by 
merchants to the thick steel sheet cartel continued 
to be greater than those that were accepted by the 
cartel. This implies that the cartel controlled the 
supply of thick steel sheet in the seller’s market 
and, in turn, the thick steel sheet market was 
suffering a serious supply shortage. 
Moreover, the military demand had had the 
top priority in the allocation of steel so that the 
shortage of steel for merchant ships became more 
serious.42 Delivery of steel to shipbuilders for 
merchant vessels was frequently delayed. In 
response to the problem, as soon as the top 
shipbuilding companies accepted an order for 
merchant ships, they made contracts to purchase 
the steel in order to prevent the critical loss in 
shipbuilding business due to steel supply shortage.43 
Accordingly, it is very likely that shipbuilding 
companies tried to purchase steel for merchant 
ships from individual steel companies. 
 
The Organizational Principle and the Market 
Principle in Steel Transaction between Individual 
Companies
In the steel transaction among individual 
companies, both the market principle and the 
organizational principle worked simultaneously in 
the transaction. 
Above all, a continuous and obligational 
contractual relationship among a few specific 
companies illustrates the principle of organization. 
Although it is very difficult to prove the existence of 
the transactions, we can guess that it is highly 
possible that a continuous and obligational 
contractual relationship existed in the thick steel 
sheet market in the 1930s. 
The clue is in the industrial organization in 
both the thick steel sheet and shipbuilding market. 
Namely, both the industries of suppliers and 
customers of the thick steel sheet had an oligopolistic 
structure. Needless to say, industrial organization 
in both supply and demand industry is just one 
factor that determines the type of transaction. 
However, it is undeniable that the industrial 
organization greatly affects the type of transaction. 
Take a close look at the industrial organization 
of the shipbuilding industry and the thick steel 
sheet industry. Although there were plenty of small 
companies in Japanese shipbuilding industry, the 
production tended to be concentrated in a few large 
companies. The tendency became more marked as 
the economy recovered from the Great Depression. 
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For example, in the 1930s, the top six shipbuilding 
companies in Japan constituted more than 90 per 
cent in the shipbuilding market. Particularly, the 
top three companies constituted more than 70 per 
cent and had a decisive lead over other shipbuilding 
companies (Table 4). 
The thick steel sheet industry was oligopolistic 
as well. For instance, Yawata, Kawasaki and Asano 
had most of the market share during the 1930s 
along with the sharp increase in production of thick 
steel sheet. In particular, since its establishment in 
1934, Nippon Steel  had maintained the top share in 
the market while the market share of Kawasaki and 
Asano had fallen since then (Table 5).  
Only a few transaction parties participated in 
the transaction of thick steel sheet, which implies 
that obligational contractual transaction of steel, a 
kind of organizational transaction, were frequently 
practiced in this steel market segment. 
Indeed, according to Table 6, it was not until 
1936 that Osaka Iron Works, whose total revenues 
comprised a high proportion of merchant 
shipbuilding, rapidly increased its inventory. 
Therefore, considering that greatest part of the 
inventory would be made up of steel, steel inventory 
of the company didn’t increase so much until 1935 
although it could have increased them much as 
possible in response to the steel shortage. As such, 
it is highly probable that it could have bought a 
stable volume of steel from specific steel companies 
as a result of an obligational contractual relationship 
before 1935. This implies the working of the 
organizational principle in the transaction of steel 
for merchant ships.
Table 4  The market share of shipbuilders and the concentration ratio of top 3 and top 6 companies (1930-37, 
launching base, ton, percentage)
ranking name of company gross tonnage market share
1 Mitubishi Shipbuilding 433,312 38.3
2 Mitsui Tama 199,658 17.6
3 Kawasaki Shipbuilding 182,387 16.1
4 Harima Shipbuilding 76,831 6.8
5 Osaka Iron Work 74,000 6.5
6 Urgaga Dock 66,443 5.9
top 3 ― 815,357 72.0
top 6 ― 1,032,631  91.2 
Source : Hashimoto (2004) 205.















Yawata   121,970  43.5 Nippon Steel   303,615  48.6 Nippon Steel     500,092  45.0
Asano    69,709  24.9 Asano   116,223  18.6 Asano     216,577  19.5
Kawasaki    60,558  21.6 Kawasaki    98,653  15.8 Kawasaki     159,387  14.4
(3 largest
 firms)   252,237  89.9
(3 largest 
firms)   518,491  83.0 
(3 largest 
firms)     876,056  78.9
Tokai    13,385   4.8 Tokai    36,328   5.8 Nakayama      59,473    5.4
Tokuyama    10,225   3.6 Osaka    24,463   3.9 Osaka      37,222    3.4
Others     4,595   1.6 Tokuyama    20,952   3.4 Tokai      34,734    3.1
― ― ― Others    24,249   3.9 Azumamachi      32,443    2.9
― ― ― ― ― ― Tokuyama      28,314    2.6
― ― ― ― ― ― Others      41,890    3.8
(total)   280,442 100.0 (total)   624,483 100.0 (total)   1,110,132 100.0
Source: Seitetsugyō Sankō Siryō [Reference Materials of Steel and Iron Industry].
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At the same time, the market principle also 
worked in transactions between individual companies. 
First, conflict of interest regarding the transaction 
volume between steel companies and shipbuilding 
companies happened frequently. For example, 
according to a diary of Hirao Hachisaburo, the 
president of Kawasaki Shipbuilding in 1934, he 
heard from a bureaucrat that Zosen Rengōkai 
complained that steel producers did not supply steel 
sufficent for ships to meet the demand, when he 
visited the Bureau of Mine at the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry. Besides, he added in the 
same diary that shipbuilding companies suspected 
and complained that the steel factory of Kawasaki 
Shipbuilding was shifting some of its production 
capacity of steel for ships to production of other 
products that were more profitable.44 
Second, due to the seller’s market in steel, 
shipbuilding companies fiercely competed with each 
other for purchase of steel for ships along with the 
intense competition in shipbuilding market. For 
example, in the “subsidy for ship improvement” that 
was mentioned earlier, shipbuilding companies 
competed for application of the policy.45
Third, the steel merchants were not good at 
adjusting the transaction volume of steel between 
the thick steel cartel and individual shipbuilders, 
especially at adjusting the quantity of steel supply 
in relation to demand. For example, according to 
Hanbai Jumpō, each merchant’s share of total 
volume of application to the cartel had been 
fluctuated wildly since the second half of 1933. 
Finally, the thick steel sheet cartel 
occasionally made spot transaction with individual 
shipbuilding companies, which primarily represents 
the functioning of the market principle.
Conclusion
Along with economic recovery from the Great 
Depression, the shipbuilding industry became 
booming. As the supply ran short of demand, the 
market became the seller’s market in the 1930s.
In this period, suppliers and customers of 
steel for ships established the cartels and 
government occasionally intervened into the 
transaction between the cartels of suppliers and 
customers. The representative example was the 
transaction of steel for ships of “subsidy for ship 
improvement”. At the same time, the agreement 
price of the steel between cartels was relatively 
lower than market price. they illustrate that the 
organization principle was strongly working.
On the other hand, the market principle 
worked in transaction of steel for ships. For example, 
despite of the cooperation between cartels, problem 
of short supply of steel after the mid-1930s was not 
improved at all. It demonstrates that there was a 
limit in working of the organizational principle. To 
Table 6 Inventory of Osaka Iron Works(Yen)
Accounting term Inventory of Osaka Iron 
Works
Accounting term Inventory of Osaka Iron 
Works
The first half of 1929 4,529,097 The second half of 1933 1,583,118
The second half of 1929 7,143,462 The first half of 1934 1,697,744
The first half of 1930 7,077,570 The second half of 1934 1,755,106
The second half of 1930 1,065,799 The first half of 1935 1,783,260
The first half of 1931 1,115,416 The second half of 1935 1,621,019
The second half of 1931 1,332,016 The first half of 1936 1,906,305
The first half of 1932 1,203,209 The second half of 1936 3,093,607
The second half of 1932 1,396,295 The first half of 1937 4,977,948
The first half of 1933 1,593,540 The second half of 1937 5,610,780
Source: Osaka Iron Works. Annual Report.
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put it another way, the market principle worked in 
forming the price of steel for ships. 
The market principle appeared in other ways 
as well. For example, even thick steel sheet cartel 
made partly market transactions of steel. In addition, 
the difference between the prices to be   requested 
by suppliers and by customers was so large that the 
agreement price between both cartels could not 
have satisfied both of them. Indeed, this was a 
reason why individual customers of the steel for 
ships transacted substantially with individual 
suppliers. It also illustrates that the market principle 
worked in this period. 
Moreover, in the steel transactions between 
individual companies, both the organizational and 
market principle worked. For example, it is highly 
probable that the obligational contractual 
transaction of steel between a few specific companies 
was practiced. It demonstrates that the 
organizational principle worked. 
On the other hand, the market principle 
worked in steel transaction between individual 
companies, too. Above all, there was conflict of 
interest between individual shipbuilders and steel 
producers. Furthermore, the steel merchants were 
not good at connecting between thick steel cartel 
and individual shipbuilders. In addition, thick steel 
sheet companies fiercely competed each other and 
so did shipbuilders. 
We can observe how the market principle 
intermingled with the organizational principle in 
inter-firm relationship of Japan’s steel industry 
during the prewar period.  First, the market principle 
and the organizational principle were related 
complementarily as well as alternatively, depending 
on circumstance. In some cases, both alternative 
and complementary relations also worked 
simultaneously. 
Second, influenced by the economic 
fluctuation, seller’s and buyer’s market appeared 
one after the other. In response to this cyclic 
change of market condition and sharp change of 
steel price that represent the market principle, 
steel companies tried to stabilize the market with 
some measures such as the obligational contractual 
transaction and cartels and so on, which represent 
the organizational principle. In brief, the same 
player could take actions to be interpreted both as 
the market principle and as the organizational 
principle. 
Third, market transaction and organizational 
transaction such as obligational contractual 
transaction coexisted and these two kinds of 
transactions influenced each other. 
Fourth, there were both conflict of interest and 
cooperation between steel companies and shipbuilding 
companies simultaneously. The former mainly 
represents the market principle whereas the latter 
mainly represents the organizational principle 
respectively. Moreover, conflict could be transformed 
to cooperation and vice versa. 
Finally, Japanese uniqueness in the inter-firm 
relationships of steel industry was not found during 
the prewar period. It illustrates that Japanese 
“specialty” argument on inter-firm relationship of 
intermediate goods industry may overemphasize the 
differences between Japan and the other countries. 
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